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Abstract 
Previous research on Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP) regarding risk 
management issues has concentrated 
predominately on the relationship between the 
Procuring Authority and the Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV) often ignoring the fact that 
SPVs are made up of different organisations 
with different interests and objectives. This 
paper makes an important contribution to 
literature in that we argue that the different 
skillsets of both the international partners in 
terms of their experience, and the domestic 
partners with regard to their local knowledge 
of the markets seems to enable the SPV to 
manage risks more effectively in a globalised 
PPP market.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have grown in prominence worldwide since their 
origination in the United Kingdom in 1992 (Wall and Connolly 2009)  and incorporate the 
private sector funding infrastructure projects traditionally provided by the public sector 
(Grimsey and Lewis 2005). It involves the sharing of risk and rewards between the public and 
private sectors with achieving Value for Money (VFM) in PPPs arguably predicated upon 
allocating risk to the party that is most capable at managing it (Shen et al. 2006; Ng and 
Loosemore 2007; Demirag et al. 2012). The National Audit Office (NAO) (2011) contend 
that the public sector is less equipped to manage risk due to their lack of skills and expertise. 
The central motivation for the public sector therefore may be to transfer risk to the Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) in order to utilise their expertise in risk management (Tallman et al. 
2010). However within the SPV, many contractors are incapable at managing certain risks, 
thus the risks transferred to the SPV (Demirag et al. 2012) and allocated between the SPV 
partners in PPPs need to be carefully considered (Dey and Ogunlana 2004; Levitt and 
Eriksson 2016). This paper contributes to this area of research by providing empirical 
evidence on how risk is managed and the techniques used by the SPV’s international and 
domestic partners in Irish toll road PPPs.  
The majority of empirical work to date on risk management in PPPs has largely 
ignored how risk is managed in the relationship between the SPV partners, but has examined 
the relationship between the public sector and the SPV (Van Ham and Koppenjan 2001; 
Edwards and Shaoul 2003; Burke and Demirag 2017) or the relationship between the public 
sector and equity and senior debt financiers (Demirag et al. 2012). Edwards and Shaoul 
(2003) found that the intended level of risk transfer failed to occur from the public to the 
private sector in Information Technology PPPs, while Demirag et al. (2012) who examined a 
number of sectors found that following risk transfer from the public to the private sector, it 
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tended to be diffused by the equity and senior debt financiers through a variety of techniques 
such as insurance, risk-sharing between SPV members, hedging and subcontracting. 
Carpintero (2015) argues that existing PPP research fails to address how risks are allocated 
within the SPV which is a notable shortcoming in the literature as the SPV are required to 
manage risk once it is transferred to them (Shen et al. 2006; Demirag et al. 2012).  
PPP projects can be difficult to manage as they involve a multitude of stakeholders 
who may have conflicting views (Klijn 2009). Loosemore and Cheung (2015) highlight that 
these stakeholders are often treated in isolation regarding how they manage risk hence the 
interdependencies between each group in PPP projects may be ignored. Furthermore, the 
partners within SPVs often have complex international relationships (Siemiatycki 2011) and 
the relationships between international partners can be collaborative or adversarial 
(Siemiatycki 2012a). This could affect how risk is managed, transferred and who is 
ultimately held responsible for these risks in a PPP project. Although Siemiatycki (2012b) 
examined the structure of consortiums (otherwise known as an SPV) in terms of their 
domestic and international partners across international PPPs, they did not explore the 
specific role of international SPV partners in terms of how they may influence domestic 
partners in their PPP risk management strategies and policies, something which this study 
strives to address.   
This paper therefore attempts to address the following research questions: 
1. Whether, and if so, how risks are managed in the relationships between the domestic and 
international SPV partners in Irish toll road PPPs?  
2. What techniques and mechanisms are used by the domestic and international SPV partners 
to manage risk in Irish toll road PPPs? 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The first section describes how 
the SPV is formed and outlines the roles and objectives of the partners within the SPV. Next, 
the internationalisation of PPP markets is discussed and using existing secondary data, the 
major SPV partners in both international and Irish transportation PPP markets are identified. 
International and domestic expertise in PPP projects is then discussed. We then examine the 
techniques and mechanisms used by the SPV to manage risk before an overview of the 
research methods used in the study is provided. The empirical findings from the in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with SPV partners from the three case studies are then presented. 
Finally, there is a discussion of the findings in the context of previous empirical work and 
their implications in terms of how the SPV is formed and how they attempt to manage risk in 
PPPs through the relationships between domestic and international partners. We also discuss 
the potential implications of the findings in terms of VFM.  
FORMING THE SPV CONSORTIUM AND SPV PARTNERS OBJECTIVES IN PPPS 
Due to the complexity of PPP projects, it is often very problematic for an individual 
construction company to negotiate all the tasks in PPPs; hence an SPV which comprises of a 
number of different companies is normally formed (Kyei and Chan 2015).  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
A lead sponsor is typically included in the SPV and a major contractor or engineering 
firm within the consortium tends to assume this role. The SPV also consists of a number of 
firms with different competencies such as facilities management, project finance and risk 
management expertise.  A lot of the tasks will be undertaken by the SPV with further tasks 
subcontracted to other companies (Siemiatycki 2011). In PPPs, many of the contractors and 
engineering companies have also become equity investors and generally the equity will 
equate to 10% of the total investment with the remaining 90% comprising of debt 
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(Siemiatycki 2011). Specialist financial institutions, including private equity and investment 
groups may also invest equity specifically in infrastructure (Demirag et al. 2011). The 
composition of the SPV can alter over time, as SPV partners may leave or sell their stake to 
another entity. Also, the subcontractors used by the SPV may change (Shaoul et al. 2012a). 
Figure 1 above from Demirag et al. (2012) illustrates the typical ownership structure of an 
SPV with an insight into how risk is transferred in PPPs. Our research contributes to this 
literature in that we examine the domestic and international relationships between SPV 
members with regard to how they manage risk.  
In terms of forming the SPV, Ahadzi and Bowles (2004) found that the SPV viewed 
the previous experience of its partners in delivering projects as very important. SPV partners 
are normally selected based on the expertise that they bring to the consortium (Siering et al. 
2013), with expertise in risk management being particularly important (Gomez and Gambo 
2016). Carpintero (2015) found that large international Spanish SPVs operating in Canada 
tended to have innovative construction and design practices in PPPs, strong financial 
expertise and access to finance due to pre-established relationships with financiers from 
previous projects. Demirag et al. (2012) note that the senior debt financiers are very particular 
regarding the companies that form the SPV as they do not want to ultimately assume risks 
should problems arise during the project. It is therefore important to assess the strength of the 
different partners in terms of their capabilities and previous experience (Boeing-Singh and 
Kalidindi 2009). Moreover, forming a strong SPV is identified in the literature as one of the 
main critical success factors in PPPs (Kyei and Chan 2015), consequently if the 
1
Procuring 
Authority, choose an unsuitable concessionaire it can impact negatively on VFM and the PPP 
projects success (Soomro and Zhang 2013). 
                                                            
1
 The Procuring Authority is a state body responsible for tendering the PPP and choosing a successful 
consortium. 
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SPV partners may have conflicting objectives in PPPs which can exacerbate the 
difficulties in managing risk (Van Ham and Koppenjan 2001). Senior debt financiers have a 
greater propensity to try avoid risk (Demirag et al. 2012) while the equity investors tend to be 
more receptive to taking risk (NAO 2012) (See table 1 below for an overview of the key 
partners roles and their objectives in the SPV) and demand a higher premium for their 
investment (Siemiatycki 2012a). Contractors tend to be primarily interested in making money 
from their construction tasks as well as through any equity they may have invested in the 
project (Demirag et al. 2015). The bundling of operations, maintenance, design and 
construction within the SPV provides an incentive for the SPV to produce a project of the 
requisite quality within time and budgetary constraints (Siemiatycki 2012a).  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL PPP MARKET AND RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SPV PARTNERS 
PPP markets are becoming more international with the transport sector the most 
vibrant (KPMG 2015), dominated by a few international contractors, financiers and 
engineering companies (Siemiatycki (2012b) who command the worldwide transportation
2
 
market (see table 2) and utilise their knowledge on an international scale (Public Works 
Financing 2013) (The composition of SPV partners in Irish road PPPs is examined later on in 
this section and can be seen in table 2 below). The supremacy of Spanish firms is notable in 
that five of the top ten transportation developers are from Spain (Public Works Financing 
2013). 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                            
2  Much of this transportation investment has been in the roads sector. 
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International expertise in PPP projects 
Examining 67 transportation Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects in the UK 
between 1987-2009, Siemiatycki (2011) found that UK firms dominated the PFI market and 
the role of international firms in SPVs has been less pronounced. Finance is, however, 
sourced internationally in many cases. Where international firms have entered the UK PFI 
market, in half of the contracts, they have formed a relationship with a large domestic UK 
contractor with wholly international owned consortiums only evident in six cases.  Also, no 
design and build contractor entered into business in more than four PPP projects and in only 
one third of the Highways Agency’s PFIs did the SPV consist of two or more of the same 
contractors (Siemiatycki 2011). Shaoul et al. (2008) found that some markets are more closed 
to international companies than others. The Spanish, French and Italian market tends to be 
dominated by the major domestic companies. In contrast, Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands appear to be more receptive towards international consortiums.   
Local expertise in PPP projects 
For the major international PPP companies that are going overseas, the task of finding 
an appropriate domestic company to partner with is an important entry strategy to that PPP 
market (Shaoul et al. 2008). Physical and cultural proximity was also found to be very 
significant and is manifest in terms of the major international consortiums entry strategies 
into the UK. International firms have entered the UK PPP market through acquiring UK 
companies or partnering with prominent UK contractors in projects. In over half of the 
projects, international firms have tended to amalgamate with experienced UK contractors that 
have been involved in at least five major UK domestic projects. The acquisition of domestic 
companies provided an astute entry strategy for international companies as they are able to 
leverage the domestic brand and create a physical presence in the marketplace (Siemiatycki 
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2011). In contrast, in the United States there has been resistance to international SPVs 
operating toll road PPPs (Ortiz and Buxbaum 2008).  
Relationship between domestic and international SPV partners in Irish road PPPs 
There are a number of domestic and international partners involved in Irish PPPs with 
Spanish firms dominating the Irish marketplace. There are between two to six consortium 
partners in each of these PPPs including contractors, operators, equity financiers and debt 
financiers (see Table 3). These include financiers and companies of Spanish, French, Dutch, 
Austrian and English origin. It also appears that in contrast to the UK which was described 
earlier in the paper, repeat collaborations between the SPV partners are evident in Irish road 
PPPs with one consortium having been successful in winning six of the tenders. Two other 
consortiums operate three and two of these schemes respectively (The findings section 
attempts to shed light on how the international and domestic partners of these consortiums 
manage risk in PPPs).  
The European Investment Bank (EIB) are also involved in financing each of these 
PPPs, while the amount of finance from foreign institutions and particularly Spanish banks 
has been significant (see table 3). The more recent changes in how PPPs are financed is 
highlighted through the use of a standby credit facility to help finance the N11 
Arklow/Rathnew scheme while the N25 New Ross scheme utilised the EIB’s 2020 Project 
Bond Credit Enhancement Scheme with Allianz Global Investors and a pension fund investor 
helping to finance the project.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Having described the internationalisation of PPP markets and identified the main SPV 
consortium partners in both international and Irish PPPs within this section, the next part of 
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the paper reviews the extant literature on how risk is managed by these domestic and 
international partners in PPPs. 
Techniques and mechanisms used by the SPV to manage risk in PPPs 
Risks in PPPs can be managed through risk-sharing and transferring risk to other parties 
(Demirag et al. 2010), or by using hedging, insurance or syndication (Demirag et al. 2012). It 
is also possible in a PPP for the SPV to transfer a multitude of risks to subcontractors 
(Asenova and Beck 2010; Chung et al. 2010; Demirag et al. 2010, 2011, 2012) such as design 
and construction risk, thus the SPV have become very reliant on subcontractors in PPPs 
(Shaoul et al. 2012a). These subcontractors are then required to ensure that various project 
requirements are met (Demirag et al. 2012), hence they play a critical role in the risk 
management process. Similarly the empirical work of Akintoye and Chinyio (2005) on 
healthcare PPPs found that subcontracting and insurance tended to be mostly used to manage 
risk. The authors detail some of the main techniques used by different SPV partners to 
manage different risks and they found that the banks are inclined to use hedging strategies 
with respect to managing interest rate risk and inflation risk. Contractors and equity investors 
tended to rely on their prior experiences in projects which corresponds with the work of 
Shaoul et al. (2007), who found that acquired experience was important in terms of managing 
risk.  Moreover, Vining et al. (2005) posit that international firms are superior at managing 
risk and they have the capacity to leverage their expertise on an international scale, while 
Chung and Hensher (2015) found that relational skills can contribute towards risk 
management.  
Equity may be used to share risk among the SPV partners in PPPs and Boeing-Singh and 
Kalidindi (2009) indicated that the senior debt financiers will want equity invested from a 
variety of sources as encouraging equity investment from the companies involved in the PPP 
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helps to spread risk among the partners (Siemiatycki 2012b) which potentially makes it easier 
to manage.  
Dey and Ogunlana (2004) examined risk management in Build Operate Transfer 
projects and found that the tools used to manage risk depends on the individual project, 
project partners attitudes and resources the company has at its disposal. The authors outline 
that different risks will be more applicable to certain SPV partners such as financiers and 
project companies as they may have conflicting objectives. It is argued that it would be 
helpful if risk analysis was applied from the viewpoint of the individual stakeholders as they 
may have different perceptions of risk. Operational and construction risk are important for the 
project companies, therefore perhaps some form of network scheduling or cost prediction 
models may be most relevant in terms of risk analysis. The financiers are primarily concerned 
with the ability of the project to generate cashflow, hence sensitivity analysis may need to be 
used (Dey and Ogunlana 2004).  
The literature outlines that many techniques and mechanisms may be used to manage 
risk such as hedging, risk-sharing, syndication and subcontracting risk to subcontractors. 
Previous experience of managing risk was also found to be important. The next section 
outlines the research methods and describes the rationale behind the case study approach 
employed in this study.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
This study utilised both secondary data and semi-structured interviews through the 
development of case studies. One of the most salient features of case studies is the in-depth 
analysis that they provide (Yin 1989; Robson 2007) and this was a major motivation behind 
choosing a case study approach (a brief background to the three case studies used in this 
study is provided in Appendix A). The use of case studies allows a deeper and richer 
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examination (Yin 1989; Creswell 1998) of risk and stakeholder issues in Irish road PPPs, 
which was the main rationale for choosing this approach. 
Initially, a number of PPP, Irish Government and private sector databases were 
examined in order to ascertain the composition of the SPV consortiums in both Irish and 
international PPPs. Interviewees across the three case studies were then asked questions with 
regard to the relationships between partners within the SPV and how they manage risk in the 
PPP process. The interview data from the case studies was analysed through the use of Nvivo 
9.  
In-depth interviews were conducted between February 2009 and July 2012 with key 
domestic and international SPV stakeholders including operators, contractors, equity 
investors, senior debt financiers, technical advisors and traffic advisers in three Irish toll road 
PPP case studies (see table 4 below). We also spoke with public sector representatives and 
interest groups which gave us an insight into how the SPV manage risk in PPPs. The table 
categorises the wide range of stakeholders based on whether they are international or 
domestically based which proved to be very useful in terms of further exploring the potential 
international/domestic relationships in the risk management process. A letter explaining the 
research was sent in advance to the interviewees, to assure them that their responses would be 
confidential and their anonymity would be preserved. 
In a semi-structured interview, flexibility is allowed regarding the topics to be 
covered (Bryman and Bell 2011). In keeping with Easterby-Smith et al. (1991), and Robson 
(2007), the interviewer was flexible with the question order and steered the interview to elicit 
answers pertaining to the research questions, while also allowing the interviewees to speak 
freely or elaborate on areas of personal interest.  
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Kelliher (2005) acknowledges that many people are sceptical of interpretive research 
due to validity, reliability and the difficulty with making generalisations, and the researchers 
were cognisant of this throughout the study. Yin (1989) argues however that case studies, in 
contrast to experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not populations. In 
essence the objective is to evolve theories and not to generate the level of frequency by which 
it occurs and this is reflective of this study. The use of multiple case studies which are used in 
this study can make the findings more robust (Remenyi et al. 1998) and Eisenhardt (1989) 
describes how multiple case studies can enable analysis both within and across case studies, 
which can help address validity and reliability concerns (Yin 1989).  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The research findings are presented in the next section. 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
This section presents the empirical findings from the case studies with the first part 
exploring the first research question in terms of whether, and if so, how risks are managed in 
the relationships between the domestic and international SPV partners in Irish toll road PPPs. 
The subsequent section examines the second research question in terms of the techniques and 
mechanisms that are used by the international and domestic SPV partners to manage risk in 
PPPs.  
Managing risk through the international and domestic SPV relationships in Irish toll 
road PPPs. 
Forming the SPV  
Senior debt financiers indicated that they are very cautious when deciding on which 
companies should be included when forming the consortium. Financiers seemed particularly 
Page 12 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpxm  Email: Isobel.speedman@ed.ac.uk
Public Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
concerned regarding the financial strength, capabilities and previous experience of the 
partners in the SPV:  
I think for the Irish deals, you know, if we did not have a big international contractor, we would 
be worried about the strength of the local contractors…We want experienced companies that are 
solid enough so that if the project goes wrong they won't end up bankrupt…We don't have a 
problem if it is just pure international contractors but I think we were comfortable with the idea of 
having local teamed up with a big international company. 
A contractor/equity investor outlined how collaboration with the international SPV 
partners was critical towards getting the project financed. This was an important 
consideration when forming the SPV: 
I suppose what we identified a long time ago, back as far as 2002-2003, was that by bringing in 
Company A and Company B, we opened up the doors to the International Banking System and 
that is what we did…The job was an almighty success and it’s down to the team....  
The importance of forming a strong team which leads to a stronger financial position 
and allows risk to be shared more evenly between the SPV partners was alluded to by an Irish 
contractor/equity investor: 
Bringing Company D and Company E in significantly strengthens your balance sheet as a team 
because they are world players and that therefore makes you very attractive from the point of view 
of the Procuring Authority and also at the end of the day to the funders, that there is a strong team 
there.  
The need for international expertise in PPP projects 
 Irish companies are very much in their infancy at managing toll road PPPs, hence 
they have integrated many international companies with the requisite expertise of managing 
risks in toll road PPPs into their consortiums (earlier in the literature review we looked at the 
breakdown of ownership within the consortiums across Irish road PPPs).  A recurring theme 
throughout the findings was the skills and knowledge that the international partners provide. 
The Irish firms realised that by approaching it single handedly, they simply did not have the 
expertise to manage all the risks involved but through collaboration with the international 
companies a strong relationship was established and risks and resources were shared as was 
explained by a contractor/equity investor on one of the schemes: 
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...We could not say as a team with hand on heart that we have experience of operating PFI 
projects or operating toll roads as a team. So we had to get someone who had toll road experience 
and that tended at the time to be the continental contractors and clearly from a PFI point of view 
Company D added to that as well. 
 
Similarly, another equity investor insisted that due to the skills they possess, 
international companies need to be involved in the process: 
There is a huge level of skills required to put together a PPP and to deliver them... if for instance 
every contractor in the country is too busy or whether they are not busy so basically have they 
work on, do they really need the work, are the skills available you know and for some, many of 
the big international companies have to be involved.  
 
A public sector representative also acknowledged the project management skills that 
the international contractors have brought to the market: 
Many local contractors would obviously prefer to have the contracts but the foreign firms have 
beaten them. The foreign firms have brought project management skills and a level of discipline 
that was not evident before in the construction of roads.  
 
 
It would appear that the composition of the consortiums across all the schemes is very 
strong. The strength of the relationships and the trust evident between the private sector 
organisations that make up the SPVs has seen them develop long term relationships and 
deliver projects ahead of schedule and without any major problems with both the domestic 
and international partners contributing as a senior debt financier outlined: 
I think there was obviously the capacity of company A with both local labour force but also local 
industry contacts, say political contacts in the Irish framework, with then the real international 
skill set that Company B bring to the table…There was a construction programme timetable to 
meet, and they blew that out of the water.   
The need for domestic expertise in PPP projects: 
The general consensus from the SPV partners is that the local expertise of the 
domestic partners is also important in terms of managing risk. This was explained by an 
international  contractor/equity investor: 
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We had a lot of expertise but we had never worked in Ireland... We merged perfectly with the 
local company; we were able to combine the international experience of our firm and the local 
experience of the Irish firm…We are still together and we are performing and tendering together 
well in other contracts.  
 
The Irish companies have a better knowledge of the local market. A contractor/equity 
investor described how the experience of the domestic partner was essential in terms of 
mitigating landowner risk after it had been transferred in one of the case studies: 
Well I think in that particular scenario, it was risky from Company A’s point of view so it was key 
to have local people. Landowners are usually very Irish. They are not happy when Spanish people 
come and talk to them…The relationship was very good, but I think it is key to have local people 
and to have a local partner in Company B. 
This was echoed by the international senior debt financiers who also outlined how 
they rely on the local partners: 
We manage it within the various parties that sit on the SPV board and so where issues crop up the 
parties are able to deal with them…They will look after any risks that arise. If it’s our 
relationships in Ireland that are to be dealt with, you tend to find that our Irish parties on the board 
will deal with those.  
The importance I suppose on those projects was that there were strong international companies 
along with domestic companies and I suppose that mix would have been really important for us 
when we were looking to decide who we would support as the bidder because we wanted to have 
the local input 
 
The findings indicate that the relationship between the domestic and international 
SPV partners contributes positively towards managing risk in PPPs. The skills, resources and 
experience of the international partners and the local knowledge of the domestic companies 
were pertinent in terms of enabling the management of risk.  
 
Techniques and mechanisms used by the domestic and international SPV partners 
to manage risk in Irish toll road PPPs 
Transfer of Risks to subcontractors  
The reliance on subcontractors also emerged as a significant theme throughout the 
findings in terms of the mechanisms that are used to manage risk by both the international 
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and domestic partners of the SPV. A contractor/equity investor explained how construction 
and design risk are mediated as they can be transferred to subcontractors: 
Yes we transfer risk all over the place. The SPV transferred all design and construction risk down 
to the construction joint venture. And in turn the construction joint venture would have transferred 
risks such as construction risks to subcontractors and design risk to our designers….  
 
We found that in some instances across the schemes, certain risks may be 
subcontracted to international or domestic subcontractors, and both provided their expertise 
for different aspects of the PPP contracts. For example on one of the schemes an international 
subcontractor was subcontracted significant work with regard to structural elements of the 
project. 
Our organisation as part of the construction team employed broad resources from outside …In the 
end these all proved to be a success, in fact one of the best contracts we had was an International 
subcontractor for the structures. 
 
On another scheme, an international tolling company who formed a subsidiary in 
Ireland, which was sourced by one of the international SPV partners, was subcontracted the 
tolling operations of the project as they had the requisite expertise in terms of managing the 
project. Nonetheless the consortium viewed the Irish contractors as more important in terms 
of the subcontracting of construction risk: 
Company B have experience across the world... It is definitely them that have brought the most 
contacts if you like to the project in terms of providing contacts for operational, the tolling 
operations whereas your Irish builders who are involved there are good at managing Irish 
construction risk aspects or are better than what Company B would be.  
On a different scheme it was suggested that international contractors or subcontractors 
are obtained in order to help manage specific risks: 
Experience.  And competition and so if they don’t have experience they can hire somebody in on 
contract, but generally these are international companies as well who have seen many many 
project across many locations. 
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Capacity of subcontractors to manage risk 
 
The capacity of subcontractors to manage risk was alluded to throughout the 
interviews. Although the subcontractors will take some parts of programme risk, risks such as 
protestor and trespasser risk appear difficult to subcontract as explained by an SPV partner: 
We have to bear in mind that subcontractors are not likely to accept certain risks… For example 
the subcontractor will accept certain programme risks... some risks that they will not accept for 
example are protestor and trespasser risk.  
The SPV partners on all the schemes suggested that there is no point in transferring 
risks to subcontractors if they cannot manage them. In essence it is in the SPV’s best interests 
to be aware of the credit quality of its subcontractors and their ability to absorb risk as an 
SPV partner explained. The risks passed on to the subcontractors may come back to the SPV 
partners if they are not able to manage them: 
Like the classic example with us sometimes, is that you get these huge PPP company risks and 
you try to pass them to a small subcontractor, and they either are not aware of them or they are 
naive and take on risks that they do not even understand. But if you make the subcontractor aware 
of it, or they are incapable of managing, dealing or coping with it, it ends up back as your risk at 
the end of the day because the subcontractor either folds or runs. There is no point in been smart 
about passing risk to somebody who can’t handle it. 
 
Another SPV partner on a different scheme explained how the subcontractors also 
have limited capacity to deal with all the risks in PPPs:  
We tried to subcontract and transfer as much risk as possible, but it is impossible for you to 
transfer all the risk… The construction company may have penalties as a result of a delay to 
opening. These are huge risks and could not be absorbed by any of the subcontractors. So 
therefore irrespective of what risk is transferred the risk is ours.  
 
The ability of the subcontractor to perform the job and manage the risk was also 
referred to by another SPV partner:  
…. If the O&M contractor for example starts to suffer in other parts of his business it may not be 
able to perform as well…that could bring them down and cause more deductions…. they are very 
important for the financiers also. 
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Managing Risks through Hedging, Insurance and Syndication   
The general consensus from the international and domestic financiers was that interest 
rate exposure may be reduced through hedging strategies:   
Once you agree with sponsors the hedging strategy you want because in the end we are not in the 
business to be lending the hard cash out of the doors and we have an open ended exposure to 
interest rate risks. 
I don’t know, usually the interest rate risk is hedged at financial close and so the project is not 
exposed to interest rate risk, but interest rate is a risk and if it is not hedged it is a significant risk 
for long term projects because you got long term cash.   
There was some evidence to suggest that the banks will want to transfer or insure as 
much risk as possible as an equity investor explained at interview: 
 Our corporate structure here, it is probably driven by the banks and what they try to do is to 
minimise the risks to the PPP Company by passing risk or insuring risk...  
Although the findings indicated that syndication has become more difficult to use in 
recent times, we found some evidence that it was used to mitigate risk by the financiers in 
PPPs: 
In simple terms you would have had, we would have taken the financing risks obviously and we 
would have syndicated some, some of the transactions to other banks…  
 
Managing risk through risk-sharing between SPV partners 
Risk-sharing emerged as another mechanism that may be used by the SPV to manage 
risk in PPPs.  The importance of having strong international organisations with the requisite 
experience and capability to absorb risk once it is transferred to the SPV was explained by the 
SPV partners. Having the additional resources which these international companies can 
provide coupled with investors sharing equity also provides the opportunity to spread risk: 
...They look around the table and see there is a big anchor there if things go wrong and Company 
D and Company E were a big anchor to be quite honest… additional resources are always a plus 
because it allows you to bid for more of these and potentially deliver more of these. The reality of 
it ultimately is that you spread all of the risk a little bit. 
It is a fully integrated JV and you take the good and the bad and share it 50/50… I think that it has 
to because if you have a system were one party in the entity is taking the risk and the other isn’t 
then it leads to bad feelings and you know it doesn’t work that way.  
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The findings indicate that the SPV prefer to transfer risk to the subcontractors where 
possible. We found evidence that certain risks were transferred to both domestic and 
international contractors in order to utilise their expertise thus emphasising the 
internationalisation of PPPs. Despite this, the consortiums felt that the ability of the 
subcontractors to be strong enough financially to manage risk was important as risks may be 
transferred back to the SPV if the subcontractors fail to manage them.  Hedging, insurance 
and syndication are also used to help mitigate risk while the sharing of risk among SPV 
partners was also viewed as an important mechanism in terms of managing risk. 
DISCUSSION AND SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of this pap r was to examine how risk is managed by the SPV partners in 
Irish road PPPs. Although the extant literature has primarily examined the concept of risk 
management in terms of the relationship between the Procuring Authority and the SPV, it has 
ignored the fact that SPVs are made of various organisations often with different interests and 
objectives. This paper makes two important contributions to previous work; firstly it 
examines the interdependencies and relationships between SPV partners in terms of how they 
manage risk in PPP markets that are becoming increasingly globally. Secondly, it also adds to 
prior literature as it provides an insight into how risk is allocated within the SPV between 
both the international and domestic partners.  
Reflecting the internationalisation of PPP markets, a small number of domestic 
contractors from Ireland are participating together with international firms on a number of 
PPP bids suggesting that a collaborative rather than an adversarial relationship is prevalent 
with three main consortiums appearing to dominate the Irish PPP market.   
 The findings from the case studies suggest that the SPV partners believe that the 
relationship between the international and domestic contractors leads to considerable 
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synergies in the Irish PPP process and contributes in terms of managing risk. Although they 
contribute greatly in terms of their local knowledge, the Irish contractor’s appear to lack the 
requisite resources, expertise and financial capabilities to do PPP deals solely by themselves. 
They therefore require collaboration and rely on financial support from international 
consortium partners in terms of their strong balance sheets which helps them to absorb and 
mediate risk.  
There is also a tendency to believe that the international partners have increased the 
SPVs chances of sourcing finance internationally and are also making it a lot easier for the 
senior debt financiers to commit to projects. Hedging and syndication were found to be 
important in terms of the techniques used to manage risk. The results of this study also 
suggest that the SPV place a heavy reliance on subcontractors when transferring risk and 
many risks such as design and construction risk are typically transferred to the 
subcontractors. Interestingly, we found some evidence to suggest that certain specific risks 
may be transferred to either international or domestic contractors/ subcontractors which 
suggests that the internationalisation of the PPP mark t has facilitated the management of risk 
in PPPs.      
Consistent with the literature, the SPV partners suggested that risk should only be 
transferred to the subcontractors where they have the capacity to manage and absorb the 
risks. The previous performance of contractors in terms of their ability to deliver projects 
effectively, on time and within budget on other schemes is becoming more important. 
Subcontractors to the SPV may not have the capacity to manage risk. Therefore the SPV, by 
diffusing risk to subcontractors, may be engaging in excessive risk transfer for which they 
may ultimately have to bear the responsibility. As PPPs are predicated upon the effective 
transfer of risk from the public to the private sector, it is vital that the private sector assume 
only those risks they can manage, and if they manage these by diffusing it to subcontractors, 
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careful consideration needs to be afforded to the capability of these subcontractors to manage 
risk as it may impact on VFM being attained. The difficulty is that the most competitive bids 
submitted by the SPV with respect to the Public Sector Benchmark tend to be successful in 
the tendering process; hence the SPV may try to be too competitive in how they price risk. 
Notwithstanding this, the most competitive subcontractor may not be the most viable in the 
long-run and both the private and public sector need to be cognisant of this in the bidding 
process. 
In many of the road PPP schemes at least three private sector contractors/operators are 
present and they usually also invest equity in the PPP. These include international companies 
which tend to be very strong financially which helps in terms of mitigating risk.  By having 
equity in the project the equity holders can potentially diversify by spreading or sharing risk 
across the SPV. Since all the SPV partners are investing equity, they realise that the financial 
robustness of the PPP will be contingent upon how they perform as part of the SPV. For 
example, the contractor would expect that the operator will be performing their duties as the 
operator will lose out if the project performs poorly. Also, if the contractor has a delay in 
construction this will affect the revenue stream and the financial model for the project. This 
highlights the importance of our study in terms of providing an insight into the formation of 
the consortium and how the domestic and international SPV partners combine to manage risk 
and various facets of PPP projects.  
The study makes an important contribution to the stakeholder literature not only 
because the roles played by SPV partners in PPPs have been largely ignored in prior literature 
but also we argue that the structure of SPVs with its global partnerships can increase the 
effectiveness of risk management. However, with many risks transferred to subcontractors it 
may be difficult to measure VFM for taxpayers.   
Page 21 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpxm  Email: Isobel.speedman@ed.ac.uk
Public Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 Future research could potentially examine the role of the subcontractors in the PPP 
process and how risk management impacts on SPV performance in more detail. Additional 
research in terms of how risk is managed in SPV relationships in other countries using road 
PPPs such as the United Kingdom or in different sectors such as education would 
complement and add to the work conducted in this paper especially as PPPs are advocated 
based on the effective transfer of risk to the private sector, as they are perceived to be 
superior at managing risk, hence if the private sector or its subcontractors are incapable at 
managing risk it may have implications for the PPPs’ performance and by implication VFM.  
Finally we advocate that a more longitudinal study be conducted. Although our work found 
that collaborative relationships were evident between the SPV partners, it is important to bear 
in mind that such relationships may change over time and the relationships between partners 
could become more adversarial if certain partners fail to perform within the SPV or if the 
project is subjected to financial pressures.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 22 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpxm  Email: Isobel.speedman@ed.ac.uk
Public Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
REFERENCES 
Ahadzi, M. and G. Bowles. 2004. “Public-private partnerships and contract negotiations: an 
empirical study.” Construction Management and Economics 22(9): 967–978. 
Akintoye, A. and E. Chinyio. 2005. “Private Finance Initiative in the healthcare sector: trends 
and risk assessment.” Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 12(6):601-
616. 
Akinyemi, B., U. Ojiako,  S. Maguire, G. Steel, and A. Anyaegbunam. 2009. “Nigerian 
Banks and the perception of risk in PPP project delivery.” Journal of Finance and 
Management in Public Services 8(2):1-20.  
Asenova, D. and M. Beck. 2003. “The UK financial sector and risk management in PFI 
Projects: A survey.” Public Money and Management 23(3):195-203. 
Asenova, D. and M. Beck. 2010. “Crucial silences: When accountability met PFI and finance 
capital.” Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21(1):1-13. 
Boeing-Singh, L. and S.N. Kalidindi. 2009. “Criteria influencing debt financing of Indian 
PPP road projects: a case study.” Journal of Financial Management of Property and 
Construction 14(1):34-60. 
Bryman, A. and E. Bell. 2011. Business Research Methods. Cambridge, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Burke, R. and I. Demirag. 2017. “Risk transfer and stakeholder relationships in public private 
partnerships.”Accounting Forum 41(1): 28-43.  
 
Carpintero, S. 2015. “Public Private Partnerships in Canada: A Case Study Approach.” World 
Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, International Journal of Social, 
Behavioural, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering 9(5):1554-1557. 
 
Chung, D., D.A. Hensher. and J.M. Rose. 2010. “Towards the betterment of risk allocation: 
Investigating risk perceptions of Australian stakeholder groups to public private partnership 
toll road projects.” Research in Transportation Economics 30(1): 43-58. 
Chung, D. and D.A. Hensher. 2015. “Risk Management in Public Private Partnerships” 
Australian Accounting Review 25(1): 13-27. 
Creswell, J.W. 1998. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, Choosing Among Five 
Traditions. London, United Kingdom:  Sage Publications. 
Demirag, I., I. Khadaroo, P. Stapleton. and C. Stevenson. 2010. Public Private Partnership 
Financiers Perceptions of Risks. Institute of Chartered Accountants, Edinburgh, Scotland.  
Demirag, I., I. Khadaroo, P. Stapleton. and C. Stevenson. 2011.  “Risks and the financing of 
PPP: Perspectives from the financiers.” The British Accounting Review 43(4):294-310. 
Demirag, I., I. Khadaroo, P. Stapleton. and C. Stevenson. 2012.  “The Diffusion of risks in 
Public Private Partnership Contracts.” Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 
25(8):1317-1339. 
Page 23 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpxm  Email: Isobel.speedman@ed.ac.uk
Public Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Demirag, I., I. Khadaroo. and P. Stapleton. 2015. “A Changing Market for PFI Financing: 
Evidence from the Financiers.” Accounting Forum 39(3):188-200.  
Dey, P. and S.O. Ogunlana. 2004. “Selection and application of risk management tools and 
techniques for build-operate-transfer projects.” Industrial Management and Data Systems 
104(4):334-346. 
Easterby-Smith, M., R. Thorpe. and A. Lowe. 1991. Management Research: an Introduction 
London: Sage. 
Edwards, P. and J. Shaoul 2003. “Partnerships for better for worse.” Accounting, Auditing 
and Accountability Journal 16(3):397-421. 
Eisenhardt, K.M. 1989. “Building theories from case study research.” The Academy of 
Management Review 14(4):532-550. 
Gomez, G. and M. Gambo. 2016. “Evaluation of special vehicle organisation skill sets 
taxonomy for effective public private partnership infrastructure project delivery.” Journal of 
Construction in Developing Countries 21(1):147-165. 
Grimsey, D. and M.K. Lewis. 2005. “Are Public Private Partnerships value for money? 
Evaluating alternative approaches and comparing academic and practitioner views”. 
Accounting Forum 29(4):345-378. 
Kelliher, F. 2005. “Interpretivism and the pursuit of research legitimisation: An integrated 
approach to single case design.” The Electronic Journal of Business Research Methodology 
3(2):123-132.  
Klijn, E.-H. (2009) “Public Private Partnerships in the Netherlands: Policy, projects and 
lessons”, Institute of Economic Affairs 29(1) 26-32. 
KPMG 2015. Public Private Partnerships, emerging trends and the implications for future 
infrastructure development in Australia, Available from https://www.kpmg.com (Accessed 
29
th
 April 2016).  
Kyei, R.O. and A.P.C. Chan. 2015. “Review of studies on the Critical success factors for 
public-private partnership projects from 1990-2013.” International Journal of Project 
Management 33:1335-1346. 
Levitt, R.E. and K. Eriksson. 2016. “Funding streams of design build finance operate 
mitigating PPP Governance Challenges: Lessons from Eastern Australia to focus future PPP 
research”, Working Paper Proceedings, Engineering Project Organisational Conference, 
Washington, USA. 
Loosemore, M. and E.Cheung. 2015.  “Implementing systems thinking to manage risk in 
public private partnership projects.” International Journal of Project Management 33:1325-
1334. 
National Audit Office (NAO) 2011. Lessons from PFI and other projects. HC920, London: 
The Stationary Office. 
National Audit Office (NAO) 2012 Equity Investments in Privately Financed Projects. 
HC1792. London.HMSO.  
Page 24 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpxm  Email: Isobel.speedman@ed.ac.uk
Public Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
National Roads Authority (2009) ‘Financial information on contracts awarded’. [ Online]. 
Available at 
http://www.nra.ie/PublicPrivatePartnership/FinancialInformationonContractsAwarded/ 
(Accessed 20
th
 April 2009). 
National Roads Authority (2012) ‘ Summary of PPP Schemes’ 
Ng, A. and M. Loosemore. 2007 “Risk allocation in the private provision of public 
infrastructure.” International Journal of Project Management 25(1):66-76. 
Ortiz, I.N. and J. Buxbaum. 2008. “Protecting the public interest in long term concession 
agreements for transportation infrastructure.” Public Works Management and Policy 13(2) 
:126-137.  
Public Works Financing 2013. World’s largest transportation developers, 2013 survey of 
public-private partnerships Worldwide, Available at pwfinance.net/research/reports ( 
Accessed 29
th
 April 2016). 
Remenyi, D., B. Williams,  A. Money and E. Swartz. 1998. Doing Research in Business and 
Management. London: Sage Publications.   
Robson, C. 2007. How to do a research project, A guide for undergraduate students Oxford, 
United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing. 
Shaoul, J., A. Stafford, and P. Stapleton. 2007. “Evidence-based policies and the meaning of 
success: the case of a road built under design, build, finance and operate.” Evidence and 
Policy3(2):159-179.  
Shaoul, J., A. Stafford, and P. Stapleton. 2012a. “Accountability and corporate governance of 
Public Private Partnerships.” Critical Perspectives on Accounting 23(3):213-229.  
Shaoul, J., A. Stafford, and P. Stapleton. 2012b. The fantasy world of private finance for 
transport via public private partnerships. Discussion Paper 2012.06, International Transport 
Forum, OECD. 
Shaoul, J., A. Stafford, P. Stapleton, and P. MacDonald. 2008. Financial Black Holes: 
Accounting for privately financed roads in the UK, Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland, Edinburgh. 
Shen, L., A.  Platten, and X. P. Deng. 2006. “Role of Public Private Partnerships to manage 
risks in public sector projects in Hong Kong.” International Journal of Project Management, 
24(7):587-594. 
Siemiatycki, M. 2011. “Public Private Partnership networks: Exploring business-Government 
relationships in United Kingdom transportation projects.” Economic Geography 87(3):309-
334. 
Siemiatycki, M. 2012a. “The Theory and Practice of Infrastructure Public-Private 
Partnerships Revisited: The Case of the Transportation Sector. Symposia Neither Public or 
Private, Mixed forms of service delivery around the Globe, Barcelona, May17-18,2012.  
Siemiatycki, M. 2012b. “The Global production of transportation Public Private 
Partnerships.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 
Page 25 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpxm  Email: Isobel.speedman@ed.ac.uk
Public Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Siemiatycki, M. 2015 “The theory and practice of infrastructure public-private partnerships 
revisited. The case of the transportation sector” 
Siering, J., A. Svensson, and G. Lindahl. 2013. “Managing stakeholder relationships in PPP 
projects”, 7
th
 Nordic Conference on Construction Economics and Organisation Trondheim, 
June 12
th
 -14
th
 2013. 
Soomro, M.A. and X. Zhang. 2013. “Failure links between public and private sector partners 
in transportation public private partnership failures.” Journal of Traffic and Logistics 
Engineering 1(2):116-121. 
Tallman, R. and J. Wheeler. 2010. “Lessons on risk transfer from Canadian public-private 
partnerships.” Review of Business Research 10(4):194-200. 
Van Ham, H. and Koppenjan, J.F.M. (2001) “Building Public-Private Partnerships: Assessing 
and managing risks in port development” Public Management Review 3(4) 593-616. 
Vining, A.R., A.E. Boardman, and F. Poschmann. 2005 “Public private partnerships in the 
U.S and Canada: There are no free lunches.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: 
Research and Practice 7(3):199-220 
Wall, A. and Connolly, C. (2009) “The Private Finance Initiative: An evolving research 
agenda?” Public Management Review 11(5) 707-724. 
Wang, N. 2011. “Risk allocation in the operational stage of private finance initiative 
projects.” Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 25(6):598-605. 
Yin, R.K.1989. Case Study Research, Design and Methods. Applied Social Research 
Methods Series. United Kingdom: Sage Publications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 26 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpxm  Email: Isobel.speedman@ed.ac.uk
Public Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
APPENDIX A 
 
Brief Overview of the Three Case Studies 
 
All three case studies that we examined are based in the Republic of Ireland and are operated 
through the use of tolls and a brief description of the case studies is provided below.  
 
Case Study one became operational in 2005 and is expected to last 30 years. It involved the 
design and construction of new motorway and the operation and maintenance of an existing 
motorway. A number of submissions were received and a shortlist of four consortiums was 
approved. Following the selection of the preferred bidder, the project reached financial close 
in 2004. The three companies in the successful consortium (one domestic and two 
international) all invested some equity at the outset of the project however the project is 
primarily financed through debt finance which has been sourced both domestically and 
internationally (NRA, 2009). 
 
The second case study is a toll based scheme and involved the construction of new motorway 
bypass with the contract expected to last 30 years in total. (NRA, 2009). 10 submissions were 
received, from which a shortlist of four companies were announced. The successful 
consortium involved a number of domestic and international investors The construction joint 
venture for the project comprised of three international and two domestic companies, and the 
finance for the project was sourced both domestically and internationally with 80% of the 
overall project being financed through senior debt. The European Commission also provided 
some support for the scheme through its Trans-European Network Budget. 
 
The third case study involved the construction of new motorway. There were a number of 
different consortiums which tendered for the scheme. The contract was awarded to a 
consortium which consisted of both an experienced international and Irish company. The 
construction joint venture was split evenly between the two companies. Finance was sourced 
on this project from a number of prominent international financiers (NRA, 2009).  
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List of Tables 
Table 1: Overview and description of SPV member’s roles and objectives in a PPP 
 
Stakeholder Description Involvement Objective 
Contractor Contractors typically design 
and construct the PPP.  
May have an 
equity stake 
throughout the 
project but 
typically involved 
in the construction 
phase 
Will seek to construct the 
project within the required 
timescale and may 
subcontract risks to 
subcontractors. 
Operator Operators are responsible for 
ensuring the effective operation 
of the PPP contract and deal 
with any operational issues or 
risks. For example, toll 
operators operate toll road 
PPPs. 
May have an 
equity stake but 
typically involved 
throughout the 
operational phase 
of the PPP. 
Will seek to operate the PPP 
effectively and deal with any 
operational or maintenance 
risks. 
Equity Investor This finance generally comes 
from specific equity financiers 
or contractors/operators. It 
normally equates to 10%-20% 
of the total project cost. 
Typically invest 
equity at the outset 
of the project but 
may sell their 
stake when the 
project becomes 
more established. 
Equity investors will 
typically want to achieve a 
decent return on their 
investment. 
Senior Debt 
Financer 
This finance generally comes 
from banking institutions that 
provide up to 90% of the 
finance in PPP projects. 
Typically invest 
debt when the 
project reaches 
financial close and 
the debt may 
become subject to 
refinancing if the 
Tend to be risk averse and 
are most concerned about 
loan obligations being met 
by the SPV. Financiers have 
a major influence on the 
allocation of risk between 
SPV partners.     
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project generates 
stable cashflows 
throughout the 
operational phase. 
Pension Funds This is an emerging type of 
funding which generally comes 
from pension funds who are 
attracted to PPP projects 
A relatively new 
type of investor 
they tend to invest 
equity in projects 
that are 
operational for a 
number of years or 
they also may 
invest at the outset 
of the project. 
They tend to be attracted to 
the stable returns that PPP 
projects can offer. 
 
(Adapted from Akinyemi et al. 2009; Asenova and Beck 2003, 2010; Ortiz and Buxbaum 
2008; Siemiatycki, 2011, 2012b, 2015; Chung et al. 2010; Demirag et al. 2012) 
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Table 2: Transportation Developers ranked by invested capital in 2013 
Company Country Total Invested $ 
millions 
No of projects active 
or sold 
Ferrovial (Cintra) Spain 73,500 55 
ACS (Hochtief and 
Iridium) 
Spain 72,000 100 
Vinci France 70,700 41 
Macquarie Australia 48,200 57 
Bouygues France 38,600 27 
Egis Projects France 26,600 26 
Sacyr Spain 21,800 41 
GlobalVia 
(FCC+Bankia) 
Spain 19,400 46 
OHL Spain 18,200 34 
John Laing UK 21,400 22 
 
(Source: Public Works Financing, 2013) 
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Table 3: List of Irish PPP road schemes 
PPP Scheme SPV Consortium partners Financiers 
N4 (T) Eurolink Siac, Cintra Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A, 
Banco Santander Hispano Bank, 
EIB 
M1 (T) Celtic Roads 
Group 
BAM, NTR,Semperian AIB, EIB, Depfa Bank, KBC/IBB, IOC, 
Societe Generale 
M8 (T) DirectRoute Strabag, Lagan, KBR,Sisk, 
Roadbridge 
HBOS, AIB,EIB,KBC,ING 
N25 (T) Celtic Roads 
Group 
Bam, Iridium, NTR Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A, 
Banco Santander, Central Hispano S.A, EIB 
LT (T) DirectRoute Lagan, Roadbridge, Sisk, 
Strabag, AIB, Meridiam 
infrastructure 
HBOS, EIB, AIB, Meridiam 
M3 (T) Eurolink Siac, Cintra Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
Santander, Credit Agricole 
N6 (T) N6 Concession 
Ltd 
FCC Construction, S.A, 
Itinere Infraestructuras, PJ 
Hegarty and Sons 
Royal Bank of Scotland, Banesto, EIB, 
Fortis, MCC  
M7/8 (T) Celtic Roads 
Group 
BAM, Iridium, NTR EIB, Bank of Ireland, Societe Generale, ING 
Bank 
M50U (T) ICON  FCC Construction, S.A, 
Itinere Infraestructuras, PJ 
Hegarty and Sons 
RBS, La Caixa, Fortis, MCC, EIB 
N11 (A) BAM PPP PGGM PGGM 
BAM Contractors 
EIB, Bank of Ireland, Standby Credit 
Facility, National Pension Reserve 
N17/N18 (A) DirectRoute Margueritte Fund, Infra 
Red Capital Partners, Sisk, 
Lagan, Roadbridge, 
Strabag 
BOI, EIB, Natixis, Societe Generale 
N25 (A) BAM PPP PGGM BAM PPP PGGM, Iridium EIB, Allianz Global Investors GmbH 
M11 (A) BAM PPP PGGM BAM PPP PGGM, Iridium EIB, Societe Generale 
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(Sources: National Roads Authority, 2009, 2012,) 
Table 4 List of Interviewees 
 
Case Study Interviewee International/
domestic 
1 Toll Operator Domestic 
1 Construction Manager Domestic 
1 Contractor International 
1 Traffic Consultant International 
1 SPV Manager Domestic 
1 Senior Debt Financier  Domestic 
1 Senior Debt Financier  International 
2 SPV Manager  Domestic 
2 SPV Partner Domestic 
2 Toll Operator International 
2 Contractor  International 
2 Contractor Domestic 
2 Contractor Domestic 
2 Senior Debt Financier  Domestic 
2 Senior Debt Financier  International 
1+2 Senior Debt Financier International 
2 Traffic Consultant International 
3 Contractor International 
3 Contractor International 
3 Contractor Domestic 
3 Contractor Domestic 
3 Legal  Advisor Domestic 
3 Traffic Consultant International 
3 Technical Consultant International 
3 Senior Debt Financier International 
All schemes Senior Debt Financier International 
All schemes Procuring Authority Domestic 
All schemes Procuring Authority Domestic 
All schemes Public Sector Policymaker Domestic 
All schemes Public Sector Policymaker Domestic 
All schemes Public Sector Advisor Domestic 
All schemes Public Sector Advisor Domestic 
All schemes Public Sector Audit Office Domestic 
All schemes Trade Union Group Domestic 
All schemes Business and Employers Group Domestic 
All schemes Motorist Group Domestic 
All schemes Accountant Domestic 
All schemes Technical Advisor Domestic 
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List of Figures 
Figure 1: Overview of the SPV relationships in PPPs  
Source: Demirag, Khadaroo, Stapleton and Stevenson (2012, p.1324) 
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